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CASE COMMENT 
THE NEED FOR EXTRATERRITORIAL 
JURISDICTION IN THE APPLICATION OF TITLE 
VII OF THE CIVIL RIGHTS ACT OF 1964: 
BOURESLAN V. ARAMCO 
Discrimination in employment, as one phase of the total civil rights 
problem, has its international implications. Each incident pointing 
up our deficiencies in extending to all our citizens full and equal 
rights and opportunities casts doubt upon our sincerity and mo-
tives in the international sphere. Because the majority of the 
world's people are non-white and have a growing influence in inter-
national relations, these incidents cannot have but significant ad-
verse effects upon foreign relations, both politically and 
economically.1 
I. INTRODUCTION 
International law recognizes the need to eradicate employment 
discrimination.2 In addition to international treaties and conven-
tions, national labor legislation also plays a significant role in effec-
tuating the international community's policy against employment 
discrimination in the United States.3 Extraterritorial jurisdiction 
1. Civil Rights: Hearings on H.R. 7152, as Amended by Subcomm. No. 5 Before the 
House Comm. on the Judiciary, 88th Cong., 1st Sess. 2302 (1963) (submitted by Mr. Powell 
from the Committee on Education and Labor). 
2. See I. LARSON, EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION § 4.10 (1984). The United Nations has 
been instrumental in implementing non-discriminatory principles in the workplace on an 
international level. The principles also help to serve as guidelines to national programs. Id.; 
see, e.g., Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women, 
G.A. Res. 34/180, U.N. Doc. A/34/46 (1979); see also T. MERON, HUMAN RIGHTS IN INTERNA-
TIONAL LAW 273-74 (2d ed. 1984). In 1944, the International Labor Organization ("ILO"), an 
organization affiliated with the United Nations, was created to adopt international labor 
standards that are embodied in conventions and recommendations. Id. Many of the ILO 
· conventions and recommendations also focus on equal opportunity and treatment in em-
ployment. Id.; see, e.g., Workers with Family Responsibilities Convention, 1981 (No. 1956); 
Convention Concerning Employment Policy 1964 (No. 122); Discrimination (Employment 
and Occupation) Convention, 1958 (No. 111); Equal Remuneration Convention, 1951 (No. 
100); Recommendation, 1951 (No. 90). 
3. See T. MERON, supra note 2, at 275. "Thus, the utility of these instruments lies in 
the availability of machinery for their acceptance by states and their effective implementa-
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allows a national law to operate outside of its traditional bounda-
ries to international situations in light of potential conflicts with 
foreign nations:' The expansion of United States multinational 
corporations into foreign markets, however, raises the issue of 
whether United States labor legislation should have extraterritorial 
application. 6 
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 ("Title VII")6 pro-
tects individuals against job discrimination based on their race, 
color, religion, sex, or national origin. 7 Over the past two decades, 
the federal district courts have afforded Title VII extraterritorial 
jurisdiction by extending this protection to American citizens em-
ployed abroad by American employers. 8 Although Title VII never 
explicitly granted enforcement outside the United States territo-
ries, the district courts have generally justified their application of 
extraterritorial jurisdiction implicitly through statutory construc-
tion. 9 The district courts have drawn a negative inference of the 
law's alien exemption provision to justify extending Title VII's 
scope to acts of employment discrimination perpetrated abroad.10 
The relevant part of this provision provides that Title VII "should 
not apply to an employer with respect to employment of aliens 
outside of any state. "11 
tion." Id.; see also Supplemental Brief for En Banc Rehearing of Appellee (ASC) at Appen-
dix C, Boureslan v. Aramco, 863 F.2d 8 (5th Cir. 1988) (No. 87-2206). The ILO Convention 
No. 111, Discrimination (Employment and Occupation), which prohibits employment dis-
crimination based on "race, colour, sex, religion, political opinion, national extraction or 
social origin," has been ratified by 109 nations. Id.; see supra note 2. 
4. See V. NANDA & D. PANSIUS, LITIGATION OF INTERNATIONAL DISPUTES IN U.S. COURTS§ 
5.01 (1988). 
5. See Brereton, U.S. Multinational Companies: Operations in 1985, 67 SuRv. CURRENT 
Bus. 26 (1987) In 1985, United States multinational corporations; total assets were 
$4,291,764 million and its foreign affiliates aggregately employed approximately 6.4 million 
people. Id. No statistical evidence of the number of American citizens employed abroad by 
United States multinational corporations could be ascertained. But see Labor Letter, Wall 
St. J., Feb. 12, 1985, at 1, col. 5. According to a survey of United States company consul-
tants, the number American citizens employed abroad for United States employers in 1984 
declined by an average of 148 to 135. Id. 
6. Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-17 (1982). 
7. See id. § 2000e-2(a)(l). "It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an em-
ployer to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual or otherwise discriminate 
against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of 
employment because of such individual's race, color, religion, or national origin." Id. 
8. See infra notes 60-68 and accompanying text. 
9. Id. 
10. Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-1 (amended in 1972 to include federal 
employees). "This title shall not apply to an employer with respect to the employment of 
aliens, outside of any state .... " Id. 
11. Id. 
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The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals en bane in Boureslan v. 
Aramco,12 reheard the first federal court of appeals decision ad-
dressing the extraterritorial application of Title VII and affirmed 
the majority panel's reversal of this line of case law which rejected 
the negative inference of the alien exemption provision.13 The ma-
jority adopted the majority panel's application of the well estab-
lished canon of statutory construction that, unless Congress indi-
cates to the contrary, the court is to construe federal legislation to 
have only domestic application. a In the absence of the requisite 
congressional intent in Title VII's statutory language and legisla-
tive history, the majority upheld the presumption against extrater-
ritoriality. 15 On the other hand, the dissent asserted that extrater-
ritorial application of United States national civil rights laws does 
not unreasonably infringe upon another nation's sovereignty in ap-
plying its own labor laws nor place the American employer at a 
disadvantage for labor in foreign markets.16 Moreover, the dissent 
contended that overseas enforcement of Title VII promotes the in-
ternational consensus against employment discrimination.17 
This Comment examines the Boureslan majority's application 
of the presumption against extraterritoriality and whether, by de-
nying Title VII extraterritorial jurisdiction, the majority was faith-
ful to the canon of statutory construction. Part II discusses the 
presumption against extraterritorial application and how the 
United States Supreme Court and the Federal Courts of Appeals 
have applied these principles in interpreting analogous federal la-
bor legislation. Part III examines Title VII's statutory language 
and legislative history18 and how the courts have construed them. 
12. 653 F. Supp. 629 (S.D. Tex. 1987), aff'd, 857 F.2d 1014 (5th Cir. 1988), aff'd on 
reh'g, 892 F.2d 1271 (5th Cir. 1990). 
13. See Bouresla.n, 892 F.2d at 1273 (citing Boureslan, 857 F.2d at 1018). 
14. See id. at 1272; Boureslan, 857 F.2d at 1017-21. 
15. See Boureslan, 892 F.2d at 1273 (citing Boureslan, 857 F.2d at 1019). 
16. See id. at 1277, 1283. · 
17. See id. at 1283. 
18. See UNITED STATES EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION, LEGISLATIVE HIS-
TORY OF TITLE VII AND XI OF CIVIL RIGHTS AcT OF 1964 at 9-11 (1968). The legislative 
history of Title VII is unusual in nature because H.R. 405, reported by the House Education 
and Labor Committee of the 87th Congress, is incorporated into H.R. 7152, which the 88th 
Congress passed as the Civil Rights Act of 1964. Id. at 9. After extensive hearings, the 
House Judiciary Committee approved H.R. 7152 through bipartisan support. Id. The House 
debated and passed H.R. 7152 within ten days due to President Kennedy's assassination 
and the priority given to this civil rights legislation. Id. at 10. Despite the lack of a Senate 
report, H.R. 7152, which included the Senate's amendments, progressed to a vote without 
debate or resolution of any discrepancies. Id. at 10-11. H.R. 7152 returned to the House and 
was approved, as amended by the Senate, after only one hour of debate. Id. at 11; see gener-
3
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Part IV discusses the facts of Boureslan and the treatment ac-
corded those facts by the majority and dissenting opinions. Lastly, 
Part V analyzes the majority's reasoning for upholding the pre-
sumption against extraterritoriality, criticizes the dissent's analysis 
of the canon of statutory construction, and recommends that Title 
VII should be afforded extraterritorial jurisdiction. The Comment 
concludes that the Boureslan majority adhered to the canon of 
statutory construction by denying Title VII application overseas in 
light of the absence of the requisite congressional intent. The ma-
jority properly deferred policy considerations to Congress. Al-
though this Comment concludes that the dissent's analysis in stat-
utory construction is technically incorrect, it emphasizes the 
dissent's opinion because it sets forth national and foreign policy 
considerations that support the need for Congress to make Title 
VII enforceable outside the United States. 
II. THE PRESUMPTION AGAINST EXTRATERRITORIALITY 
A. The Canon of Statutory Construction 
Congress has the constitutional authority to promulgate legis-
lation in regulating American citizens and their conduct outside 
the United States.19 The Supreme Court has determined, however, 
tha~ federal legislation should only be afforded extraterritorial ju-
risdiction where Congress evinces an intent to have the legislation 
extend extraterritorially.20 The requisite congressional intent must 
be manifested in the statutory language, legislative history, or ad-
ministrative interpretations. 21 An underlying justification of this 
canon of statutory construction is that traditionally the Court has 
presumed that Congress enacts laws that are to apply domestically 
to avoid interfering with another nation's sovereignty.22 
ally B. SCHWARTZ, STATUTORY HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES CIVIL RIGHTS, PART II 1291 
(1970). 
19. See Steele v. Bulova Watch Co., 344 U.S. 280, 282 (1952); Skiriotes v. Florida, 313 
U.S. 69, 73 (1941); Blackmer v. United States, 284 U.S. 421, 436 (1932). From the interna-
tional perspective, see I. BROWNLIE, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 303 (1970); M. 
SHAW, INTERNATIONAL LAW 352-57 (2d ed. 1986). Extraterritorial jurisdiction by a state 
based on regulation of its citizens outside its territory is commonly referred to as the "na-
tionality principle" of jurisdiction in international law. Id. 
20. See Steele, 344 U.S. at 285; Foley Bros., Inc. v. Filardo Bros., 336 U.S. 281, 285 
(1949); United States v. Bennett, 232 U.S. 299 (1944); Blackmer, 284 U.S. at 437; United 
States v. Bowman 260 U.S. 94 (1922). 
21. See Foley Bros., 336 U.S. at 285-90. 
22. See id. at 285; see also RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF 
THE UNITED STATES § 402 comment b (1987). Territorial jurisdiction exercised by the state 
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B. Requisite Congressional Intent for Federal Labor Statutes 
Although there is a presumption against extraterritoriality, it 
is rebuttable. 23 The Supreme Court has required explicit congres-
sional intent to overcome the presumption against extraterritorial-
ity where a law's global reach would yield potential conflicts with 
another nation's territorial jurisdiction.u Although federal anti-
competition legislation has generally been afforded extraterritorial 
application,25 federal labor legislation has been traditionally denied 
extraterritorial jurisdiction26 because labor is construed as primar-
ily a domestic concern. 27 
In McCulloch v. Sociedad Nacional de Marineros de Hondu-
in which the activity or conduct has occurred is the traditional jurisdictional procedure. Id. 
Alternatively, the state of nationality of the actor can also exercise jurisdiction under excep-
tional circumstances. Id. The concurrent exercise of jurisdiction by the state nationality and 
by the territorial state may culminate in actual or potential conflicts. Id. 
23. See Pfeiffer v. Wm. Wrigley Jr. Co., 755 F.2d 554, 557 (7th Cir. 1985) (citing 
Tamari v. Bache & Co. (Lebanon) S.S.L., 730 F.2d 1003, 1107-08 & n.11 (7th Cir. 1984)). 
24. See McCulloch v. Sociedad Nacional de Marineros de Honduras, 372 U.S. 10, 21-22 
(1962) (requiring the threshold level of congressional intent to be affirmatively expressed); 
Foley Bros., 336 U.S. at 286 (requiring clearly expressed congressional intent to overcome 
the presumption against extraterritoriality). 
25. See Sherman Antitrust Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7 (1988); Continental Ore Co. v. Union 
Carbide & Carbon Corp., 370 U.S. 690, 706 (1962) (holding a conspiracy to monopolize or 
restrain the domestic or foreign commerce of the United States is not outside the reach of 
the Sherman Act just because part of the conduct complained occurs in foreign countries); 
Mannington Mills v. Congoleum Corp., 595 F.2d 1287, 1291 (3d Cir. 1979) (exporting and 
other commercial transactions between the United States and a foreign country that ad-
versely and materially affect United States trade are not exempt from United States anti-
trust laws in light of the act or agreement happening outside United States territories). For 
anticompetitive acts dealing with trademarks and patents, see Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 
1051-127 (1988); see, e.g., Steele, 344 U.S. at 287 (district court may award injunctive relief 
for trademark infringements and unfair competition perpetrated abroad by a United States 
corporation because extraterritorial reach does not interfere with Mexico's trade practices). 
26. See Airline Stewards & Stewardesses Ass'n Int'l v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 273 
F.2d 69, 70 (2d Cir. 1959), cert. denied, 362 U.S. 988 (1960) (denying the extraterritorial 
application of the Railway Labor Act); Airlines Stewards & Stewardesses Ass'n lnt'l v. 
Northwest Airlines, Inc., 267 F;2d 170 (8th Cir. 1959), cert. denied, 361 U.S. 901 (1959) 
(denying the extraterritorial application of the Railway Labor Act); Benz v. Compania 
Naviera Hidalgo, S.A., 353 U.S. 138 (1957) (denying the extraterritorial application of the 
Labor Management Relations Act of 1947); Sandberg v. McDonald, 248 U.S. 185 (1918) 
(denying the extraterritorrial application of the Seaman's Act of 1915). 
27. See Foley Bros., 336 U.S. at 286 ("an intention so to regulate labor conditions 
which are the primary concern of a foreign country should not be attributed to Congress in 
the absence of a clearly expressed purpose"). See also RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOR-
EIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 414 comment c. "Jurisdiction may be exer-
cised . . . over activities of a branch or subsidiary related to international transactions, . . . 
but not generally over predominantly local activites, such as industrial and labor relations . 
. . . "Id. 
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ras,28 the Supreme Court refused to apply the National Labor Re-
lations Act ("NLRA") 29 extraterritorially after finding that Con-
gress did not intend the Act "to have application to foreign 
registered vessels employing alien seamen."30 The Court concluded 
that extraterritorial application of the NLRA would be an affront 
to Honduran sovereignty if the United States regulated the inter-
nal management disputes of an American corporation overseas em-
ploying Honduran citizens. 31 In light of the potential international 
jurisdictional conflicts and the absence of affirmative congressional 
intent, the Court declined to extend concurrent application of the 
NLRA and deferred to Congress whether the NLRA should have 
an extraterritorial scope. 32 
The Supreme Court has also examined whether Congress in-
tended the Eight Hour Law to have extraterritorial application. 33 
Due to the absence of a clear expression of congressional intent, 
the Supreme Court in Foley Bros., Inc. v. Filardo3• denied to apply 
the Eight Hour Law extraterritorially because enforcement of the 
Act would conflict with the sovereignty of Iran and Iraq in regulat-
ing local work conditions according to their own mores and cus-
toms. 35 In reviewing the statutory language, legislative history and 
administrative interpretations the Court concluded that Congress 
failed to clearly express its intent. 36 Therefore, the Court applied 
the presumption against extraterritoriality. 37 The Court reasoned 
that despite the Eight Hour Law's broad inclusive language, 38 the 
Act failed to distinguish between "laborers who are aliens and 
those who are citizens of the United States."39 In the absence of 
this distinction, the Court ruled that Congress must have intended 
that the Eight Hour Law should be limited to regulating domestic 
28. 372 U.S. 10 (1962). 
29. 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-68 (1982 & Supp. 1986). 
30. See McCulloch, 372 U.S. at 19-20 (neither the legislative history nor the specific 
language couched in "commerce" terms reflected the boundaries of the Act's impact). 
31. See id. at 21. 
32. See id. at 21-22 (citing The Charming Betsy, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 64, 118 (1804) and 
holding that extraterritorial application of the NLRA intrudes upon the international laws 
of the high seas and an "act of Congress ought never be construed to violate the law of 
nations if any other possible construction remains"). 
33. Contract Work Hours Standard Act, 40 U.S.C. §§ 321-26 (repealed 1962). 
34. 336 U.S. 281 (1949). 
35. See id. at 286. 
36. See id. at 285-90. 
37. See id. 
38. See id. at 287 (rejecting the assertion that the statutory language of "every con-
tract" implied work contracts perfomed in foreign countries). 
39. See Foley Bros., 336 U.S. at 286. 
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work conditions; otherwise, Congress would be preempting the la-
bor laws of Iran and Iraq.4° 
C. Congressional Reaction to the Presumption Against 
Extraterritoriality 
The Age Discrimination in Employment Act ("ADEA")•1 is 
the most closely related labor statute to Title VII. Both civil rights 
statutes share a common goal of eradicating employment discrimi-
nation and contain similar substantive provisions. 42 Several federal 
circuit courts of appeal have refused to apply the ADEA extraterri-
torially prior to its amendment in 1984.43 The courts concluded 
that no affirmative congressional intent can be ascertained from 
the ADEA's statutory language, legislative history, and administra-
tive interpretations to overcome the presumption against extrater-
ritoriality.•• They buttressed their reasoning on three factors. First, 
the ADEA incorporates the Fair Labor Standards Act's procedure 
and policies, which explicitly deny extraterritorial application.45 
Second, the courts have merely reaffirmed the "general policy of 
applying the presumption against extraterritoriality of labor 
40. See id. at 290-91. 
41. 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-34 (1982 & Supp. V 1988) (prohibiting employers from arbitrarily 
discriminating against persons over the age of 40). 
42. See Lorillard v. Pons, 434 U.S. 575, 584 (1977). 
43. See DeYoreo v. Bell Helicopter Textron, Inc., 785 F.2d 1282 (5th Cir. 1986) (hold-
ing that a 65-year-old United States citizen who worked in Canada for six years prior to his 
termination had no protection under the ADEA where the American employer filled his 
position with a younger employee); Ralis v. RFE/RL, Inc., 770 F.2d 1121 (D.C. Cir. 1985); 
Zahourek v. Arthur Young & Co., 750 F.2d 827 (10th Cir. 1984) (holding a 43-year-old 
United States citizen employed in Honduras who sought a transfer back to the United 
States and was subsequently fired by the United States corporation had no protection under 
the ADEA because the employment occurred in a fereign workplace); Thomas v. Brown 
Roots, Inc., 745 F.2d 279 (4th Cir. 1984); Cleary v. United States Lines, Inc., 728 F.2d 607 
(3d Cir. 1984) (holding a 64-year-old United States citizen employed in England had no 
protection under the ADEA upon his termination by the parent company located in the 
United States because there was lack of sufficient nexus between the parent corporation and 
its foreign affiliate). 
44. See id. 
45. See Cleary, 728 F.2d at 608-09. The Cleary court held that Congress is presumed to 
be aware of the court's interpretation of the domestic scope of the FSLA and yet it incorpo-
rated like provisions in the ADEA; therefore, Congress intended the ADEA to have no ex-
traterritorial application. Id.; cf. Thomas, 745 F.2d at 828 (affirming Cleary); Pfeiffer, 755 
F.2d at 555-56 (affirming the Cleary analysis but asserting it to be debatable in light of the 
inexact fit betwen the FSLA and the ADEA); DeYoreo, 785 F.2d at 1283 (affirming Pfeiffer); 
Zahourek, 750 F.2d at 828 (affirming Pfeiffer). See generally Fair Labor Standards Act, 29 
U.S.C. §§ 201-19 (1982 & Supp. III 1985). 
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laws."46 Lastly, the ADEA lacks language similar to alien exemp-
tion provision of Title VII, which has been construed to afford Ti-
tle VII extraterritorial application.47 Congress reacted to these ju-
dicial decisions by amending the ADEA with explicit jurisdictional 
language to overcome the presumption against the extraterritorial 
application of federal labor statutes. 48 The amendment provides 
that the term "employee includes any individual who is a citizen of 
the United States employed by an employer in a workplace in a 
foreign country."49 
Ill. THE STATUTORY LANGUAGE AND LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF 
TITLE VII 
A. Definitions 
The legislative history of Title VII provides that Congress in-
tended to regulate equal employment opportunities pursuant to its 
commerce clause powers.50 The Act's pivotal terms of "commerce" 
and "industry affecting commerce" must be carefully examined to 
determine the scope of Title VII's coverage. n Some commentators 
have stated the wording "between a state and any place outside 
46. Cleary, 728 F.2d at 609; see Pfeiffer, 755 F.2d at 557. 
47. See Cleary, 728 F.2d at 609 (citing Bryant v. International Schools Service, Inc., 
675 F.2d 472, 482 (D.N.J. 1980)); see also Ralis, 770 F.2d at 1124; Pfeiffer, 755 F.2d at 559. 
48. See H.R. REP. No. 1037, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 49, reprinted in 1984 U.S. CODE CoNG. 
& ADMIN. NEWS 2974, 3000. 
Id. 
When considering this amendment, the Committee was cognizant of the well estab-
lished principle of sovereignty, that no nation has the right to impose its labor stan-
dards on another country. That is why the amendment is carefully worded to apply 
only to citizens of the United States who are working for United States corporations 
or their subsidiaries. 
49. Age Discrimination in Employment Act, 29 U.S.C. § 630(f) (Supp. 1988). 
50. See generally UNITED STATES EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION, LEGIS-
LATIVE HISTORY OF TITLE VII AND XI OF CIVIL RIGHTS AcT OF 1964 at 3076-78 (1968) (re-
printing a memorandum submitted by Deputy Attorney General Nicholas deB. Katzenbach 
as to the constitutionality of Title VII, which was inserted in the record by Senator Clark, a 
floor leader of the House-approved H.R. 7152). 
51. These terms are . based on the definition of employer, which embodies the term 
"commerce" and "industry affecting commerce," and are of great significance to under-
standing the statutory scheme. "[E]mployer means a person engaged in an industry affect-
ing commerce .... "Civil Rights Act of 1964, Title VII, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b) (1982). "[T]he 
term commerce means trade, traffic, commerce, transportation, transmission, or communica-
tion among the several states, or between a state and any place thereof ... . "Id. § 2000e(h). 
"[T]he term industry affecting commerce means any activity, business, or industry in com-
merce or in labor disputes would hinder or obstruct commerce or the free-flow of commerce 
and includes any activity or industry affecting commerce within the meaning of the Labor 
Management Reporting and Disclosure Act of 1958" Id. § 2000e(g). 
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therefore" found in the definition of commerce indicates that Con-
gress at the very least intended Title VII to apply to American 
employers' operations abroad.62 The legislative history also reveals 
that Congress intended Title VII to have international application 
by employing standard "commerce" type language.63 The Supreme 
Court, however, has ruled that this type of statutory scheme is in-
conclusive proof to overcome the presumption against extraterrito-
riality when couched in terms of "commerce."64 
B. The Alien Exemption Provision and the Courts' 
Interpretation 
As indicated above, this provision explicitly denies Title VII 
coverage to aliens employed outside the United States.66 The legis-
lative history provides little guidance as to the implications of the 
alien exemption provision.66 In Espinoza v. Farah Mfg. Co.,67 how-
52. See Note, Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and the Multinational Enter-
prise, 73 GEO. L.J. 1465, 1469-70 (1985); Note, Civil Rights in Employment and the Mul-
tinational Corporations, 10 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 87, 93-94 (1976). 
53. See UNITED STATES EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION, LEGISLATIVE HIS-
TORY OF TITLE VII AND XI OF CIVIL RIGHTS AcT OF 1964 at 3091 (1968) (recorded by Chair-
man Emmanuel Cellar, the key sponsor to the Act in the House Judiciary Committee). "Ti-
tle VII covers employers engaged in industries affecting commerce that is to say interstate 
and foreign commerce. . . . " Id. 
54. See, e.g., McCulloch, 372 U.S. at 21 (denying the NLRA's definitions of "com-
merce" and "affecting commerce" definitions meaning for the NLRA's scope to extend 
outside the United States); Benz, 353 U.S. at 144 (denying the Labor Management Rela-
tions Act of 1959, 29 U.S.C. §§ 401-531 (1982) ("LMRA"), extraterritorial jurisdiction be-
cause its "commerce" and "industry affecting commerce" terms do not clearly express extra-
territorial reach); see generally H.R. REP. No. 245, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. (1947) (revealing 
that the NLRA and LMRA commerce provisions are comparable). 
55. See supra note 10. 
56. See UNITED STATES EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION, LEGISLATIVE HIS-
TORY OF TITLE VII AND XI OF C1v1L RIGHTS AcT OF 1964 at 1004 (1968). Upon enacting Title 
VII, the congressional debate focusing on the alien exemption provision entertained the sole 
issues of exempting religious and educational institutions. Id.; see also Kirschner, The Ex-
traterritorial Application of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, 34 LAB. L.J. 394, 399-400 
(1983). The alien exemption provision's language was apparently derived from a civil rights 
bill introduced by Adm. Clayton Powell in 1949 and was simply adopted into Title VII of 
the Civil Rights Act. Id. The Clayton Bill was introduced at a time when the constitutional 
rights of aliens were questionable and there was heightened dislike for aliens within the 
United States; therefore, it is asserted that the bill's language was carefully drafted to en-
sure that aliens were not precluded from "certain domestic labor protective legislation." Id. 
at 400 n.26; see also Note, Civil Rights in Employment and the Multinational Corpora-
tions, 10 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 87, 95 n.45 (1976) (citing the Fair Employment Practice Act, 
H.R. 44-53, 81st Cong., 1st Sess. (1949), reported out of the COMMITTEE ON EDUCATION AND 
LABOR, H.R. REP. No. 1165, 81st Cong., 1st Sess. (1949)). 
57. 414 U.S. 86 (1973) (holding that denial of employment opportunities by requiring 
employees to be United States citizens is not an unlawful employment practice under Title 
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ever, the Supreme Court determined the scope of Title VII by 
drawing a negative inference from this provision.68 The Court con-
cluded that the alien exemption provision denies Title VII cover-
age to aliens outside the United States.1~9 Thus, the negative infer-
ence drawn from the provision provides Title VII protection to 
aliens within the United States. 
Despite the Supreme Court's limited interpretation of the 
alien exemption provision's negative implication, the Federal Dis-
trict Court of Colorado in Love v. Pullman interpreted the identi-
cal Title VII language more broadly.60 The court drew an alterna-
tive negative inference from this provision, and concluded that 
Congress explicitly denied Title VII protection to aliens outside 
the United States.61 This conclusion intimated the court's belief 
that Congress intended to provide Title VII coverage to citizens 
employed outside the United States by an American employer who 
would otherwise have been covered by Title VIl.62 To substantiate 
this alternative negative inference, the court relied upon the Su-
preme Court's reasoning to afford federal antitrust legislation ex-
traterritorial application,63 and stated that "nothing in the legisla-
tive history addresses this specific point" but that nothing 
contradicts it. 64 
In Bryant v. International Schools Serv., Inc.,65 the first fed-
eral case squarely addressing the extraterritorial jurisdiction of Ti-
tle VII, the New Jersey District Court found Love's reasoning per-
suasive.66 In the absence of explicit congressional intent to extend 
VII because it is different than discriminating against employees based on national origin). 
58. See id. at 95 (the term "individual" also entitles aliens Title VII protection as illus-
trated by the definition of employer at 42 U.S.C. § 2000(e)(l)). 
59. See id. 
60. See Love v. Pullman, 13 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 423, 426 n.4 (D. Colo. 1976), 
aff'd on other grounds, 569 F.2d 1074 (10th Cir. 1978) (Canadian porters while employed in 
the United States are protected by Title VII). 
61. Id. 
62. Id. 
63. See Continental Ore Co., 370 U.S. at 690 (a United States exporter may bring suit 
in the United States unde.r § 4 of the Clayton Act where he was deprived a market in Can-
ada due to alleged conspiracy, in violation of §§ 1 and 2 of the Sherman Antitrust Act, 
which had adverse consequences to him in the United States). 
64. See Love, 13 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 426 n.4. 
65. 502 F. Supp. 472 (D.N.J. 1980), rev'd on other grounds, 675 F.2d 562 (3d Cir. 1982) 
(the Court of Appeals reversed the lower court's holding because plaintiff's failed to demon-
strate a prima facie case of discrimination mandated by Title VII). 
66. See id. at 474-76 (upholding a cause of action brought by two American teachers 
alleging that their employer, a United States corporation that contracted with the Iranian 
government, discriminated against them by withholding benefits, which were made available 
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the Act beyond the United States territories, the court nonetheless 
concluded that the Love alternative negative inference of the alien 
exemption provision overcomes the presumption against extraterri-
toriality. 67 The Love line of reasoning gained more acceptance in 
the district court.68 This alternative negative inference, however, 
has been questioned.69 The district court's precedent in supporting 
the extraterritorial application of Title VII, in light of the pre-
sumption against the extraterritorial application of federal legisla-
tion, was challenged in Boureslan v. Aramco before the United 
States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit. 70 
IV. Boureslan v. Aramco 
A. The Facts of the Case 
In 1979, Ali Boureslan, a naturalized citizen of the United 
States, was employed by Aramco Services Company ("ASC"), a 
Delaware corporation, as a cost engineer in Houston, Texas. 71 
Boureslan had worked approximately sixteen months with ASC 
and alleged no discriminatory treatment while employed in the 
United States.72 Upon his request, Boureslan obtained a transfer to 
the Arabian American Oil Company ("Aramco"), ASC's parent 
corporation. 73 
by other corporations employing American citizens in Iran). 
67. See id. at 482-83. (the negative inference fairly interprets congressional intent to 
afford Title VII extraterritorial coverage without addressing the foreign policy implications). 
68. See Seville v. Martin Marietta Corp., 638 F. Supp. 590 (D. Md. 1986) (applying the 
reasoning in Bryant, 675 F.2d at 472); Kern v. Dynaelectron, 577 F. Supp. 1196 (N.D. Tex. 
1983), aff'd mem., 746 F.2d 810 (5th Cir. 1984) (assuming Title VII's extraterritorial juris-
diction without interpreting Title VII based on the canon of statutory construction); EEOC 
v. Institute of Gas Technology, 23 Fair Emp. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 825 (N.D. Ill. 1980) (apply-
ing Title VII extraterritorially without determining whether the requisite congressional in-
tent was satisfied). 
69. See Bryant, 675 F.2d at 477 n.23. "Our holding in no way answers the questions 
raised by jurisdictional challenge. No court has decided the extraterritorial applicability of 
Title VII and we find it unnecessary to do so to decide this case." For an interpretative 
view, see Kirschner, supra note 56, at 398-99 (since the majority or the concurring opinion 
never entertained the extraterritorial impact of Title VII, Bryant lacks precedent). But see 
I. LARSON, supra note 2, at § 5.60 (the Third Circuit, by "not[ing] that the district court's 
holding that the statute may be extraterritorially applied ... apparently indicate[d] a sub 
silentio upholding of jurisdiction ... "). 
70. See Boureslan, 857 F.2d at 1017-21. 
71. See id. at 1015-16. 
72. See Brief for Appellees (Aramco) at 3, Boureslan v. Aramco, 857 F.2d 1014 (5th Cir. 
1988) (No. 87-2206) [hereinafter Brief for Appellees]. 
73. See Boureslan, 857 F.2d at 1016. 
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On November 11, 1980, Boureslan started work at Aramco74 in 
Saudi Arabia as a construction engineer.n He contended that, in 
September of 1981, his supervisor at Aramco began "a campaign of 
harassment" against him because of his Lebanese ancestry, Arab 
race and Muslim religion. 76 Boureslan alleged that in retaliation for 
having brought a formal grievance process against his supervisor, 
Aramco manipulated its policies and procedures to justify his dis-
charge in June 1984.77 He alleged that his termination was "pretex-
tual in nature because of his race, religion, and national origin. ''78 
After filing timely charges with the Equal Employment Op-
portunity Commission ("EEOC"), Boureslan brought an action 
pursuant section 703 of Title VII against ASC and Aramco in the 
Federal District Court for the Southern District of Texas. 79 Con-
trary to the reasoning in Love, the district court dismissed Bourse-
lan's claim, holding that the negative inference of the alien exemp-
tion provision was inconclusive proof of congressional intent to 
afford Title VII extraterritorial jurisdiction.80 Upon reviewing the 
statutory language and legislative history of Title VII, and prior 
Supreme Court cases denying extraterritorial application to other 
federal labor statutes, the district court concluded that Congress 
never implicitly or explicitly addressed the extraterritorial impact 
of Title VIl.81 
The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals granted Boureslan's appeal 
and request for rehearing.82 On appeal and rehearing, Boureslan 
argued against the district court's narrow construction of the ex-
traterritorial scope of Title VIl.83 He also argued that the alien ex-
7 4. See Brief for the Appellees, supra note 72, at 3. For discussion on whether Aramco 
is an employee under Title VII. Aramco conceded that it was subject to Title VII because it 
alleged only subject matter jurisdiction. Id. Although Aramco's assets are benefically owned 
by the Government of Saudi Arabia and its work force is composed of less than twelve 
percent of American citizens, it is a United States employer incorporated in Delaware. Id. 
75. See id. at 3. 
76. See Boureslan, 857 F.2d at 1016. 
77. See Brief for Appellant (Boureslan) at 4, Boureslan v. Aramco, 857 F.2d 1014 (5th 
Cir. 1988) (No. 87-2206) [hereinafter Brief of the Appellant]. 
78. See id. at 4-5. 
79. Boureslan, 653 F. Supp. 629 (S.D. Tex. 1987). 
80. See id. at 630 (holding Bryant suspect in light of the Supreme Court's interpreta-
tion in Espinoza v. Farah Mfg. Co., Inc., 414 U.S. 86 (1973), of the alien exemption 
provision). 
81. See id. at 630-31. 
82. See Boureslan, 857 F.2d at 1015 Uoined by the EEOC as amicus curiae); see also 
Boureslan, 892 F.2d at 1271. 
83. See Boureslan, 857 F.2d at 1015. 
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emption provision is meaningless unless the Love alternative nega-
tive inference is drawn.84 
B. The Majority Opinion 
The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals reaffirmed the rulings of 
the lower court and the majority panel and dismissed the action 
for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.86 The court applied the ca-
non of statutory construction and upheld the presumption against 
the extraterritorial application of federal legislation.88 Upon exami-
nation of the statutory language of Title VII, the majority con-
cluded that no explicit congressional intent could be ascertained. 87 
The majority rejected the district court's decision holding that 
the alternative negative inference of the alien exemption provision 
satisfied the requisite congressional intent to afford Title VII pro .. 
tection to United States citizens employed abroad.88 Contrary to 
Boureslan's assertion that the alien exemption provision is mean-
ingless without the Love alternative negative inference, the Court , 
held that the provision has two clear purposes. 89 The first purpose 
is obviously to make Title VII inapplicable to aliens outside the 
United States; the second purpose is to extend Title VII's coverage 
84. See Boureslan, 892 F.2d at 1272. 
85. See id. at 1271. 
86. See id. at 1272-74. 
87. See Boureslan, 857 F.2d at 1018-19. On appeal, the majority panel examined the 
definitional section of Title VII and held that the extraterritorial application of Title VII 
was not addressed in the pivotal definitions of "employer", 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b), and "com-
merce", 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(g), or in the alien exemption provision, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(g). See 
id. at 1018. This reasoning was adopted by the majority on rehearing. See Boureslan, 892 
F.2d at 1271. The majority on rehearing, however, further examined the plain language of 
the Act to buttress its conclusion that Congress never explicitly addressed the extraterrito-
rial reach of Title VII. First, the majority reexamined the broad definition of "employer" 
and held that the extraterritorial scope of Title VII was not intended by Congress because 
foreign employers who employ United States citizens and who engaged in United States 
commerce would be interpreted as employers under Title VII. See id. at 1273 (citing Spiess 
v. C. Itoh & Co. (America), Inc., 643 F.2d 353 (5th Cir. 1981)). Second, the majority reexam-
ined the state discrimination employment provisions in Title VII, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-5(c) to 
(e), and held that Congress did not intend Title VII to apply extraterritorially because it 
would have made specific references in the above provisions to avoid conflicts with foreign 
discrimination laws. See Boureslan, 892 F.2d at 1273. Third, the majority construed the 
venue provision in Title VII, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(0(3), and the EEOC's investigatory powers 
provision, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-9, and concluded that no explicit congressional intent was 
found in the above provisions which are typical provisions in which Congress ordinarily ad-
dresses extraterritoriality. See Boureslan, 892 F.2d at 1273. Finally the majority reexamined 
the alien exemption provision, which was reargued on rehearing. See id. at 1272-73. 
88. See id.; see also supra notes 60-67 and accompanying text. 
89. See Boureslan, 892 F.2d at 1273 (citing Bourselan, 857 F.2d at 1018). 
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to aliens within the United States.90 
On rehearing, the majority also adopted the majority panel's 
conclusion that the legislative history of Title VII provided no ba-
sis to overcome the presumption against extraterritoriality.91 The 
three general policy statements from the legislative history offered 
by the EEOC92 were held to be inconclusive proof of congressional 
intent to support extraterritorial jurisdiction of Title VIl.93 Rather, 
the majority reasoned that these statements lacked specificity in 
light of the language of the statute and legislative history, which 
are laden with terms such as "United States" and "states."94 
The majority supported its use of the presumption against ex-
traterritoriality by noting the serious foreign policy issues that may 
arise on account of a conflict between our national civil rights laws 
and other nation's mores and customs.96 The majority panel's rea-
90. See id.; see also supra notes 57-59 and accompanying text. 
91. See Boureslan, 892 F.2d at 1273 (citing Bourselan, 857 F.2d at 1019). 
92. See Brief of the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission Amicus Curiae at 8-
14, Boureslan v. Aramco, 857 F.2d 1014 (5th Cir. 1988) (No. 87-2206) [hereinafter EEOC 
Brief]. The Equal Employment Opportunity Commission offered these statements to show 
that Congress intended all citizens to be protected by Title VII regardless of geographical 
restrictions. Id. at 13. The first statement provided that "to remove obstructions to the free 
flow of interstate and foreign commerce and to insure the complete and full enjoyment by 
all persons of the rights, privileges, and immunities secured and protected by the Constitu-
tion. Id. (citing HousE REPORT ON CIVIL RIGHTS AcT OF 1964, H.R. REP. No. 914, 88th Cong., 
1st Sess. 26, reprinted in 1964 U.S. CoDE CoNG. & ADMIN. NEWS 2391, 2402). The second 
statement provided that "[a] key purpose of the bill, then is to secure to all Americans the 
equal protection of the laws of the United States and of the several states." EEOC Brief at 
14. See H.R. REP. No. 914, 88th Cong., 1st Sess. 1, reprinted in 1964 U.S. CODE CONG. & 
ADMIN. NEWS 2391, 2488 (statement of Rep. William McCulloch, ranking minority member 
of the House Judiciary Committee). The last statement was the continuation of the minor-
ity report which states that "the rights of citizenship means little if an individual is unable 
to gain the economic wherewithal to enjoy or properly use them." Id. (quoting H.R. REP. No. 
914, 88th Cong., 1st Sess. 29, reprinted in 1964 U.S. CoDE CoNG. & ADMIN. NEWS 2391, 
2516). 
93. See Espinoza, 414 U.S. at 94 (the EEOC's interpretation is to be afforded "great 
deferrence" except where its interpretations can be proven through "compelling indica-
tions"). Accord Boureslan, 857 F.2d at 1019. The majority gave no deferrence to the EEOC's 
interpretation in light of Espinoza because the majority held that the EEOC was inexperi-
enced in determining jurisdictional issues. Id. at 1019. But cf. E.E.O.C. Will Look Closely at 
Overseas Bias Charges, 130 Lab. Rel. Rep. (BNA) at 388 (1989) (citing speech by Commis-
sioner Joy Cherian at City University of New York's Baruch College on March 8, 1989). 
Subsequent to Boureslan, the EEOC declared that it will continue "to adhere 'very strictly' 
to the requirements that Title VII must conflict with the laws of the foreign country before 
conduct prohibited by Title VII will be excusabl~." Id. 
94. See Boureslan, 892 F.2d at 1273 (citing Bourselan, 857 F.2d at 1019). "The Act's 
language and legislative history make repeated references to the 'United States,' 'states,' 
and procedures relating to state proceedings without parallel references to foreign coun-
tries." Boureslan, 857 F.2d at 1019. 
95. See Boureslan, 892 F.2d at 1273 (citing American Banana Co. v. United Fruit Co., 
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soning, adopted by the majority on rehearing, also argued that ex-
tending Title VII protection to American employees abroad would 
seriously impair international operations of American employers 
who would be forced to abandon their operations or abstain from 
employing United States citizens.96 Refusing "to read between the 
lines" of Title VII, the majority upheld the presumption against 
extraterritoriality and concluded that any resulting inequities to 
American employees working abroad are policy issues best ad-
dressed by Congress. 97 
C. The Dissenting Opinion 
The dissent asserted that the majority misapplied the canon of 
statutory construction by requiring explicit, affirmative language to 
overcome the presumption against extraterritoriality.98 Because 
Congress addressed the extraterritorial scope of Title VII in the 
alien exemption provision, the dissent contended that the majority 
distorted the presumption to avoid reaching foreign policy issues.99 
The dissent noted that there are, in fact, two presumptions and 
applied a two-pronged test to determine which applied and 
whether it could be overcome.100 Two presumptions were employed 
· because "not every exercise of extraterritorial jurisdiction violates 
213 U.S. 347 (1909)). "The respect for the right of nationals to regulate conduct within their 
own borders is a fundemental concept of sovereignty that is not lightly tossed aside." Id. In 
initially setting forth the precedent upholding a presumption against extraterritoriality, the 
majority noted that "[t]he fear of outright collisions between domestic and foreign law, col-
lisions both hard on the people caught in the cross-fire and a potential source of friction 
between the United States and foreign countries lies behind the presumption against extra-
territoriality." Boureslan, 857 F.2d at 1017 (citing Pfeiffer, 755 F.2d at 557). 
96. See id. at 1020. 
97. See Boureslan, 892 F.2d at 1274. "Congress demonstrated in the [ADEA, the Com-
prehensive Anti-Apartheid Act of 1986, 22 U.S.C. §§ 5001-116 (1979 & Supp. 1989), and the 
Export Administration Act, 50 U.S.C. App. §§ 2401-20 (Supp. 1989)] its awareness of the 
need to make a clear statement of extraterritorial application, address the concerns of con-
flicting foreign law, and provide the usual nuts-and-bolts provisions for enforcing those 
rights." Id.; see Boureslan, 857 F.2d at 1029. "Given the serious, potentially devisive policy 
to such an application either in the Act itself or the debates in Congress is a compelling 
argument that Congress did not turn its attention to this possibility. It is not for this court 
to decide this policy issue for the legislative branch." Id. 
98. See Boureslan, 892 F.2d at 1274 n.1; see also Boureselan, 857 F.2d at 1021-23. The 
dissent argued that the broad jurisdictional language of the statute is not required to over-
come the presumption against extraterritotiality. Id. 
99. See Boureslan, 857 F.2d at 1283. 
100. See Boureslan, 892 F.2d at 1274-75 (citing Boureslan, 857 F.2d at 1021-31). The 
dissent did not reiterate Judge King's analysis in the rehearing opinion, thus all references 
for purposes of this Comment will refer to the decision in the initial appeal. 
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international law."101 The first presumption provided that the 
court is not to apply federal legislation extraterritorially unless 
Congress indicates to the contrary; the second provides that the 
court should not construe a statute to unreasonably frustrate inter-
national law.102 
The dissent asserted that a more structured analysis of the 
foreign policy issues is needed to avoid defeating congressional in-
tent. 103 The first prong, therefore, focused on whether extraterrito-
rial application of a statute would violate international law by in-
fringing upon another nation's sovereignty.1°" To determine 
whether international law was violated, the dissent implemented 
the jurisdictional rule of reason in section 403 of the Restatement 
of the Foreign Relations Law of the United States. 106 
The second prong focused on whether the presumption in the 
first prong can be overcome based on the finding of the requisite 
congressional intent.106 The dissent asserted that the two presump-
tions require different levels of congressional intent to be over-
come. 107 After concluding that extraterritorial jurisdiction does not 
101. See id. at 1025; see also RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF 
THE UNITED STATES § 402. 
102. See Boureslan, 857 F.2d at 1022-24. 
103. See id. at 1024-25. 
104. See id. at 1025-26. 
105. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES 
§ 403(2). Whether exercise of jurisdiction over a person or activity is unreasonable is deter-
mined by evaluating all relevant factors, including, where appropriate: 
Id. 
(a) the link of the activity to the territory of the regulating state, i.e., the extent 
to which the activity takes place within the territory, or has substantial, direct, and 
foreseeable effect upon or in the territory; 
(b) the connections, such as nationality, residence, or economic activity, be-
tween the regulating state and the person principally responsible for the activity to 
be regulated, or between that state and those whom the regulation is designed to 
protect; 
(c) the character of the activity to be regulated, the importance of regulation to 
the regulating state, the extent to which other states regulate such activities, and 
the degree to which the desireability of such regulation is generally accepted; 
(d) the existence of justified expectations that might be protected or hurt by 
the regulation; 
(e) the importance of the regulation to the international political, legal, or eco-
nomic system; 
(f) the extent to which the regulation is consistent with the traditions of the 
international system; 
(g) the extent to which another state may have an interest in regulating the 
activity; and 
(h) the likelihood of conflict with regulation by another state. 
106. See Boureslan, 857 F.2d at 1024. 
107. See id. 
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unreasonably conflict with international law, the dissent argued 
that the presumption against extraterritoriality that be overcome 
by statutory construction as well . as legislative history.108 The pre-
sumption against extraterritoriality, therefore, may be overcome 
through implicit congressional intent. 109 Conversely, upon conclud-
ing that extraterritorial jurisdiction conflicts with international 
law, the dissent asserted that the courts must find affirmative con-
gressional intent to overcome the presumption that "an act of Con-
gress ought never be construed to violate the law of nations if any 
other possible construction remains. "110 Therefore, express juris-
dictional language is necessary because only Congress can prescribe 
legislation that unreasonably conflicts with international law.111 
In applying the two-pronged test, the dissent concluded that 
application of Title VII to United States citizens abroad was rea-
sonable in the interest of advancing the civil rights of United 
States citizens and the international policy of eradicating employ-
ment discrimination. m Depriving United States citizens of a rem-
edy against employment discrimination by a United States corpo-
ration has cumulative discriminatory effects within the United 
States that may satisfy the "reasonableness" requirement pursuant 
to section 403 of the Restatement.118 Denial of Title VII protection 
108. See id. at 1034. But see Boureslan, 892 F.2d at 1277 n.3. "Contrary to the major-
ity's characterization" the dissent argued that the legislative history is not "to compensate 
for a lack of statutory language" because the plain language of the Act is sufficient to over-
come the presumption against extraterritoriality. Id. 
109. See Boureslan, 857 F.2d at 1022 (relying on the Court's language in Foley Bros.); 
accord Foley Bros., 336 U.S. at 285 ("the canon of construction which teaches that legisla-
tion of Congress, unless a contrary intent appears, is meant to apply only within the territo-
rial jurisdiction of the United States, ... is a valid approach whereby unexpressed congres-
sional intent can be ascertained." (citation omitted; emphasis added)). 
110. See Boureslari., 857 F.2d at 1023 (citing The Charming Betsy, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) at 
118); see also RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES 
§ 114. 
111. See Boureslan, 857 F.2d at 1023; see also RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN 
RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES§ 115 comment a. 
112. See Boureslan, 892 F.2d at 1283; see also supra notes 2-3 and accompanying text. 
For further discussion of international civil rights agreements, see Note, Equal Employment 
Opportunity for Americans Abroad, 62 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1288, 1298 (1987); I. BROWNLIE, PRIN-
CIPLES OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW, 568-71 (3d ed. 1979). 
113. See Boureslan, 892 F.2d at 1279 (citing Boureslan, 857 F.2d at 1027). The Su-
preme Court has held that economic effects of discrimination are rationally related to Con-
gress' commerce clause powers and therefore regulation of discriminatory practices by pri-
vate establishments affecting interstate commerce is justifiable. See Heart of Atlanta Motel 
v. United States, 379 U.S. 241 (1964) (upholding the constitutionality of Title II of the Civil 
Rights Act of 1964); Katzenbach v. McClung, 379 U.S. 294 (1964). The dissent finds the 
cumulative economic labor effects within the United States by a private employer overseas 
under Title VII similar and applicable to the reasonableness standard of § 403 of the Re-
17
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to citizens abroad frustrates career advancements within the 
United States because acceptance of foreign assignments is neces-
sary to climb the corporate ladder .114 Women and minorities may 
be reluctant to accept foreign assignments and pref er to remain in 
the United States where they are fully protected by Title VII.m 
The extraterritorial application of Title VII is needed to ensure 
equal employment opportunities abroad so that career advance-
ments within the United States are not adversely effected.116 
The dissent also asserted that the extraterritorial reach of Ti-
tle VII does not impinge upon Saudi Arabia's sovereignty because 
only those American corporations employing American citizens will 
be subject to it.117 Furthermore, the bona fide occupational qualifi-
cation defense provided by Title VII118 will alleviate any direct 
conflict that may arise.119 The dissent determined that Title VII's 
extraterritorial reach does not unreasonably conflict with interna-
tional law and concluded that the negative inference of the alien 
exemption provision was a fair and reasonable interpretation 
which evidenced clear congressional intent to overcome the pre-
sumption against extraterritoriality.120 
statement to justify regulating discriminatory effects abroad. See Boureslan, 857 F.2d at 
1027 n.16. 
Id. 
114. See id. at 1284. 
115. See id. 
116. See id. 
117. See id. at 1283. 
118. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(e) (1981). 
Notwithstanding any other provision of this subchapter, (1) it shall not be an un-
lawful employment practice for an employer to hire and employ employees, ... on 
the basis of his religion, sex or national origin in those certain instances where reli-
gion, sex, or nation of origin is a bona fide occupational qualification reasonably 
necessary to the normal operation of that particular business or enterprise .... 
119. See Boureslan, 892 F.2d at 1283; see also Kern v. Dynaelectron, 577 F. Supp. 1196, 
1196 (N.D. Tex. 1983) (the bona fide occupational qualification defense provided a mecha-
nism for an American employer to discrimin(lte based on religion where the local regulations 
prohibit non-Muslims from entering the holy city of Mecca and the penalty for violating 
this law is death). Cf. Abrams v. Baylor College of Medicine, 581 F. Supp. 1570 (S.D. Tex. 
1984), aff'd, 805 F.2d 528 (5th Cir. 1986) (religious discrimination against Jews participating 
in a medical program in Saudi Arabia due to the friction between Jews and Arabs was not a 
valid bona fide occupational qualification defense); Fernandez v. Wynn Oil Co., 653 F.2d 
1273 (1981) (the bona fide occupational qualification defense must be narrowly construed to 
preclude male gender as a valid basis for this defense where chauvanism of South American 
businessmen was alleged). 
120. See Boureslan, 892 F.2d at 1283-84. 
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V. AN ANALYSIS OF Boureslan v. Aramco 
In a lengthy opinion, the dissent found the necessity to extend 
Title VII's scope extra territorially based on national and · foreign 
policy considerations, but its reasoning failed to substantiate the 
congressional intent required to apply Title VII extraterritorially. 
A closer examination of the dissent's two-pronged test shows that 
the dissent misapplied the jurisdictional rule of reason as well as 
the canon of statutory construction. The first part of this analysis 
will discuss the jurisdictional rule of reason. The second part will 
discuss the flawed application of the canon of statutory construc-
tion on three levels: first, the Supreme Court precedent that only 
one presumption must be overcome; second, the Supreme Court 
requirement that explicit congressional intent be shown before ap-
plying federal labor statutes extra territorially; and third, the lack 
of congressional intent necessary to support a negative implication. 
The last part of this analysis will discuss the significance of 
Boureslan and the need for congressional action. 
A. The Jurisdictional Rule of Reason 
The dissent's two-pronged test is flawed because it is based 
upon application of the Restatement (Third) of the Foreign Rela-
tions Law of the United States. 121 This Restatement provides that 
the reasonableness test should be applied by the courts as a matter 
of law to determine whether to authorize or exercise the extraterri-
torial application of a federal statute.122 The dissent employed this 
jurisdictional rule of reason as a matter of law in its threshold in-
quiry of whether the extraterritorial application of Title VII would 
unreasonably frustrate international law.123 The dissent's analysis, 
however, goes beyond the Supreme Court's analyses in McCulloch 
and Foley Bros., which only examined congressional intent and de-
f erred resolution of potential conflicts to Congress. 124 
Undermining the credibility of the Restatement (Third) of the 
Foreign Relations Law of the United States is the fact that the 
jurisdictional rule of reason has not been ruled upon by any 
121. See supra note 105 and accompanying text. 
122. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES 
§ 403 comment g (concurrent jurisdiction based on the principles of nationality and territo-
riality may be reasonable as a matter of law to interpret legislation as to its reasonableness 
in not violating international law); see also id. § 402 comment i (a court may prescribe 
jurisdiction). 
123. See Boureslan, 857 F.2d at 1024. 
124. See supra notes 28-40 and accompanying text. 
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court. m Rather, courts traditionally apply the jurisdictional rule of 
reason under the Restatement (Second) of the Foreign Relations 
Law of the United States in determining whether to apply federal 
legislation extraterritorially.126 The courts have not prescribed ex-
traterritorial jurisdiction as a matter of law in the absence of con-
gressional intent, and defer to the legislation and executive 
branches for foreign policy decisions. 127 To remedy the denial of 
civil rights to American citizens employed abroad by United States 
corporations, the dissent engaged in judicial legislation by applying 
the rule of reason as a matter of law.128 
B. The Canons of Statutory Construction 
1. The Presumption Against Extraterritoriality 
The dissent's two-pronged test employed two presumptions 
with differing requisite thresholds of congressional intent.129 The 
dissent's conclusion that two presumptions exist undermines the 
Supreme Court's canon of statutory construction by separating the 
125. See Boureslan, 857 F.2d at 1025 n.10. 
126. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES 
§ 40 comment e (1965) (a reasonableness test should be applied to determine whether en-
forcement of a statute extraterritorially is reasonable); see also Laker Airways v. Sabena 
Belgian World Airlines, 731 F.2d 909 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (applied antitrust legislation extrater-
ritorially because adjudication was reasonable in light of international comity to protect its 
jurisdiction); Mannington Mills v. Congoleum Corp., 595 F.2d 1287 (3d Cir. 1979) (antitrust 
laws to have world-wide reach but declined to enforce the Sherman Antitrust Act extraterri-
torially until a balancing test of twenty-six foreign countries' interest was determined in 
light of international comity); Timberlane Lumber Co. v. Bank of Am~ Nat'l Trust & Sav. 
Ass'n, 549 F.2d 597 (9th Cir. 1976) (holding the Sherman Antitrust Act had extraterritorial 
jurisdiction but declined to enforce the Act because of the unreasonableness in light of in-
ternational comity and fairness). 
127. See Maier, Extraterritorial Jurisdiction at a Crossroads: An Intersection between 
Public and Private International Law, 76 AM. J. INT'L L. 280, 293 (1982) (citing RESTATE-
MENT (SECOND) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 40 (1962)). "The 
principal function of section 40 is to provide international legal sanctions for the exercise of 
judicial restraint, which permits courts to justify their decisions not as judicial legislation 
but rather as being consonant with the presumed intent of Congress to act in accordance 
with international legal principles." Id. 
128. See Addison v. Holly Fruit Prod. Inc., 322 U.S. 607, 618 (1944) (quoting Kirsch-
baum Co. v. Walling, 316 U.S. 517, 522 (1942)). 
Id. 
While judicial function in construing legislation is not a mechanical process from 
which judgment is excluded, it is nevertheless very different from the legislative 
process. Construction is not legislation and must avoid 'that retrospective expansion 
of meaning which properly deserves the stigma of judicial legislation.' To blur the 
distinctive functions of the legislation and judicial processess is not conducive to 
responsible legislation. 
129. See supra notes 106-11 and accompanying text. 
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presumption against extraterritoriality.130 The second presumption 
that "an act of Congress ought never to be construed to violate the 
law of nations if any other possible construction remains" is not a 
second presumption but a basic principle of international law.131 
This basic principle is rooted in international comity, which pro-
vides that the sovereignty of other nations should be respected in 
determining whether to apply a domestic law extraterritorially.132 
The dissent's distinction between the two presumptions was 
buttressed by the Court's reasoning in McCulloch. 133 Because the 
Court never explicitly stated the term "presumption against extra-
territoriality" and relied heavily upon the principles of interna-
tional comity, the dissent concluded that the two presumptions are 
in force. 134 The dissent's analysis, however, misconstrued the 
Court's reasoning in McCulloch because that case dealt with extra-
territorial jurisdiction on the high seas and not extraterritorial ju-
130. See supra notes 23-27 and accompanying text. 
131. See Boureslan, 893 F.2d at 1272; accord American Banana, 213 U.S. at 356-57 
(holding a United States-owned company in Panama had no cause of action under the Sher-
man Antitrust Act for antitrust violations). The Court in American Banana demonstrated 
that the presumption against extraterritorial application incorporates the basic principles of 
international law. 
[T]he general and almost universal rule is that the character of an act as lawful or 
unlawful must be determined wholly by the law of the country where the act is 
done .... For another jurisdiction, if it should happen to lay hold of the actor, to 
treat him according to its own notions rather than those of the place where he did 
the acts, not only would be unjust, but would be an interference with the authority 
of another sovereign, contrary to the comity of nations, which the other state con-
cerned justly might resent. . . . The foregoing considerations would lead in case of 
doubt to a construction of any statute as intended to be confined in its operation 
and effect to the territorial limits over which the the lawmaker has general and 
legitimate power. 'All legislation is prima facie territorial.' 
Blackmer, 284 U.S. at 437 (citation omitted; citing American Banana in setting forth the 
presumption against extraterritoriality); see also Amicus Curiae Brief of Rule of Law Com-
mittee at 11-12, Boureslan v. Aramco, 857 F.2d 1014 (5th Cir. 1988) (No. 97-2206). But see 
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS. LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 415 (the 
rigidity of the American Banana rule has been diminished by the Supreme Court by pre-
scribing jurisdiction to regulate anti-competitive activities). 
132. See Maier, Extraterritorial Jurisdiction at a Crossroads: An Intersection Between 
Public and Private International Law, 76 AM. J. INT'L L. 280, 283 (1982). 
Id. 
The comity principle was originally developed to explain how a sovereign state, ab-
solutely powerful within its own territory, could give recognition or effect in its 
courts to another nation's laws without diminishing or denying its own sovereignty. 
The doctrine is also one of local restraint, limiting the application of sovereign 
power to extraterritorial events and persons. 
133. See Boureslan, 892 F.2d at 1274 n.1 (citing Boureslan, 857 F.2d at 1021-31); see 
also Boureslan, 857 F.2d at 1023; supra notes 28-32. 
134. See Boureslan, 857 F.2d at 1023. 
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risdiction in regard to a particular locality. m 
2. The Requisite Congressional Intent 
The dissent asserted that the canon of statutory construction 
required merely unexpressed congressional intent for a court to ap-
ply a federal statute overseas. 186 However, Judge King understated 
the importance of Title VIl's subject matter.187 The Supreme 
Court has determined that only clear express congressional intent 
will overcome the presumption against the extraterritorial applica-
tion of federal labor legislation.188 The Court's reasoning is but-
tressed by the notion that a nation's sovereignty should be 
respected because regulation of labor within its territory is primar-
ily a domestic concern. 189 
135. See McCulloch, 372 U.S. at 20-21. 
Therefore, we find no basis for a construction which would exert United States ju-
risdiction over and apply its laws to the internal management and affairs of the 
vessels here flying the Honduran flag, contrary to the recognition long afforded 
them not only by our State Department but also by the Congress. In addition, our 
attention is called to the well-established rule of international law that the law of 
flag state ordinarily governs the internal affairs of a ship. 
Id. The McCulloch court was, therefore, restrained from asserting jurisdiction based on the 
well established law of the high seas that provides that the state flag flown on the ship is the 
sole state which may exercise jurisdiction over the ship. See id. But see Skiriotes, 313 U.S. 
at 73-7 4 (a Florida criminal statute forbidding a certain type of sponge diving by its citizens 
applied to the high seas or to a foreign country where "the acts are directly injurious to the 
government, and are capable of perpetration without regard to particular locality ... "). 
136. See Boureslan, 892 F.2d at 1274 n.1. 
137. See Boureslan, 892 F.2d at 1278-79. The dissent found support for the Love alter-
native negative inference of the alien exemption provision based on Foley Bros. See id. The 
dissent asserted that "the court [in Foley Bros.] relied heavily on the fact that the [Eight 
Hour Law] drew no distinction between citizens and aliens. An extraterritorial application, 
therefore, would necessarily involve foreign national laborers, thereby creating a risk that 
the United States would intrude upon an area of local concern to foreign nations." Id. at 
1278. Thus, the dissent concluded that the necessary congressional intent was found because 
the alien exemption provision explicitly differentiates between aliens and citizens and pre-
cludes coverage of aliens employed outside the United States. See id. "[C]ongress addressed 
the factor that the Supreme Courts had identified as most likely to violate principles of 
foreign sovereignty in the extraterritorial application of United States labor laws." Id. at 
1278-79. But see STAFF OF COMM. ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS HOUSE OF REP. AND COMM. ON FOREIGN 
RELATIONS U.S. SENATE, 100TH CONG., 2D SESS., COUNTRY REPORTS ON HUMAN RIGHTS PRAC-
TICES FOR 1987 at 1298 (Comm. Print 1987) [hereinafter CouNTRY REPORTS]. Saudi Arabian 
labor laws are irreconcilable with Title VII because equal opportunities for non-Muslims 
and women are circumscribed. Id. In light of the above conflict with a host country's law 
and international comity, Congress must explicitly state its intent to have Title VII extra-
territorially applied. 
138. See supra notes 23-40 and accompanying text. 
139. See supra note 27 and accompanying text. See also, Boureslan, 892 F.2d at 1278 
n.7. The dissent interpreted "the labor conditions of 'primary concern' to foreign nations 
[to] refer[] to the employment of aliens by the United States enterprises abroad." Id. Con-
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3. The Negative Inference of the Alien Exemption Provision 
The dissent employed the traditional methods of statutory 
construction and found that the negative inference of the alien ex-
emption provision and the legislative history clearly revealed that 
Congress intended Title VII to be extraterritorially applied.140 The 
dissent found the Love alternative negative inference to be a per-
suasive indication of congressional intent and necessary to give 
meaning to the provision.141 Because aliens and citizens are both 
treated as employees within the United States, the dissent asserted 
that the Act's exemption of aliens is futile unless United States 
citizens abroad were given Title VII protection.142 The dissent's 
reasoning, however, is repugnant to the canon of statutory con-
struction because a negative implication drawn from the statutory 
language is not an explicit statement of congressional intent.143 
The dissent found support for the Love alternative negative 
inference of the alien exemption from the Supreme Court's reason-
ing in Espinoza. 144 Despite the irrelevancy of the Court's interpre-
tation of this provision in light of the Court's failure to apply Title 
VII extraterritorially, the dissent asserted that the Court's use of a 
negative inference legitimatized its use of the Love alternative neg-
ative inference to ascertain congressional intent.146 Moreover, the 
dissent relied upon one statement in the legislative history, re-
jected by the majority on appeal and rehearing, which reveals that 
the provision was intended by Congress to avoid international ju-
risdictional conflicts.146 The dissent reasoned that the legislative 
trary to the dissent, labor conditions in foreign nations are a primary and local concern. See 
supra note 48. "The term 'sovereignty' expresses a nation-state's right to exercise absolute 
political and legal authority over all persons and property within its territory . . . internal 
sovereignty being the inherent right of a peoples to govern their internal affairs." Street, 
Application of United States and Abroad, 19 INT'L L. & PoL. 357, 372 (1987.). 
140. See Boureslan, 892 F.2d at 1275-76. 
141. See id. at 1275. 
142. See Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356 (1886) (a facially nondiscriminatory zoning 
ordinance that discriminates in its application violates the equal protection clause); see also 
Truax v. Raich, 118 U.S. 356 (1915). 
143. See supra notes 23-40 and accompanying text. 
144. See Boureslan, 892 F.2d at 1276. 
145. See id. 
146. See id. (citing Civil Rights: Hearings on H.R. 7152, as amended by Subcomm. No. 
5 Before the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 88th Cong., 1st Sess. 2303 (1963) (testimony of 
James Roosevelt, member of Congress from State of California)). 
In Section 4 of the Act, limited exception is provided for employers with respect to 
employment of aliens outside of any state and also, to any religious corporations, 
associations, or societies. The intention of the first exemption is to remove conflicts 
of law which might otherwise exist between the United States and a foreign nation 
23
Goldstein: The Need For Extraterritorial Jurisdiction in the Application of
Published by SURFACE, 1990
316 Syr. J. Int'l L. & Com. [Vol. 16:293 
history supported the underlying logic of the Love alternative neg-
ative inference.147 Although the dissent's reliance on the legislative 
history is questionable because of its collaborative nature, 148 the 
legislative history fails to explicitly state sufficient congressional 
intent for the court to apply Title VII extraterritorially because a 
negative inference must still be drawn from the legislative history 
which is contrary to the canons of statutory construction for fed-
eral labor legislation.149 
C. The Necessity for Congressional Action on Title VII 
The sole issue presented in Boureslan is a critical question es-
pecially in light of the expansion of international trade and mar-
kets. The importance of whether the protection of Title VII ex-
tends to United States citizens employed by United States 
multinational corporations on foreign soils was demonstrated by 
the fact that the case was reheard by the full panel of the Court of 
Appeals for the Fifth Circuit. The Boureslan decision will have 
profound adverse effects upon many United States citizens and in-
ternational civil rights laws. Congressional review of the extraterri-
torial scope of Title VII is necessary to discourage employment 
discrimination in the United States and in the international 
sphere. 
1. The Restrictive Scope of the Canon of Statutory Construction 
The majority followed precedent by noting, but refusing to re-
solve, the serious foreign policy implications that are necessarily 
encountered upon the extraterritorial application of Title VII. 160 
The majority indicated that international application of Title VII 
infringed upon other nations' sovereignty, especially where equal 
employment opportunities are not recognized. un The majority's 
in the employment of aliens outside the United States by an American enterprise. 
Id. 
147. See id. at 1276-77. 
148. See id. at 1277 n.3. The dissent panel asserted that H.R. 405, the conclusions of 
the Committee on Education and Labor, which was submitted into the record of H.R. 7152 
and thus became Title VII, is "persuasive indicia of congressional intent" of the meaning of 
the alien exemption provision. Id. But see id. at 1020 n.4. The majority held that a state-
ment offered into the record by members of a House subcommittee that did not partake in 
the voting of the bill from the Judiciary Committee, and to the full House for a final vote, is 
not a clear expression of congressional intent. Id. 
149. See supra notes 23-40 and accompanying text. 
150. See Boureslan, 892 F.2d at 1274. 
151. See Boureslan, 857 F.2d at 1020-21; see also COUNTRY REPORTS, supra note 138. 
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conclusion demonstrated the restrictive scope of the judiciai;y's 
powers in the absence of the requisite congressional intent.162 Pur-
suant to its power to legislate, Congress must determine whether 
extraterritorial jurisdiction in the regulation of its nationals is rea-
sonable in light of the serious foreign policy ramifications. 153 
2. National and International Policy 
The legislative history of Title VII reveals that the purpose of 
the Act was to provide citizens with equal employment opportuni-
ties and to demonstrate this country's commitment against em-
ployment discrimination to the international community.m As in-
dicated by the dissent, denial of Title VII protection to women and 
minorities employed overseas substantially affects their right to 
equal employment opportunities within the United States.155 Fear-
ing discriminatory treatment, women and minorities may be less 
willing to accept foreign assignments, which might have a detri-
mental effect upon multinational employers' ability to hire quali-
fied employees.156 The denial of Title VII protection to citizens 
employed abroad contravenes our national policy of equal employ-
ment opportunities. 157 Moreover, the international enforcement of 
Title VII demonstrates the commitment of the United States to 
furthering the international consensus against employment dis-
crimination.158 Congressional action to amend Title VII is neces-
sary to effectuate our national policy and the international commu-
152. See Boureslan, 892 F.2d at 1274. 
153. See supra note 19 and accompanying text. 
154. See Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1962, H.R. 1370, 87th Cong., 2d Sess. 
2156 (1962). "[C]ontinued employment in the United States casts doubt upon our sincerity 
in furthering the cause of individual liberty and human dignity." Id.; see also Boureslan, 
857 F.2d at 1028 (quoting Special Message to Congress by the President, June 19, 1963, 109 
CONG. REC. 1055) "[L]egislative inaction on civil rights would result in 'weakening the re-
spect with which the rest of the world regards us.'" Id. 
155. See supra notes 113-15 and accompanying text. 
156. See Title VII Does Not Apply to U.S. Citizens Employed Abroad by U.S. Compa-
nies, 129 Lab. Rel. Rep. (BNA) 265, 268 (Oct. 31, 1988). 
157. But see Madigan, The Applicability of U.S. Employment Laws Abroad: A Legal 
and Practical Approach, 4 EMPLOYEE REL. L.J. 319 (1978) (extraterritorial application of 
Title VII would have injurious effects on United States employment, tax consequences, and 
trade because United States multinational corporations are likely to relocate outside the 
United States if Title VII liability was extended worldwide). · 
158. See Boureslan, 892 F.2d at 1279 (citing Boureslan, 857 F.2d at 1027-28). "Since 
Title VII expands on anti-discrimination pr.inciples that have been the subject of interna-
tional concern, there can be no doubt that the desirability of the regulation is generally 
accepted, and that the regulation is important to the international community and consis-
tent with the traditions of the international system." Boureslan, 857 F.2d at 1028. 
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nity's policy of eradicating employm~nt discrimination. 
3. Congressional Precedent 
The ADEA's amendment is of great significance to the deter-
mination of the extent of the extraterritorial protection under Ti-
tle VII, because the amendment and Title VII have analagous pur-
poses.169 In 1984, Congress amended the ADEA to provide 
American citizens employed abroad with protection against arbi-
trary age discrimination perpetrated by American employers.160 
The protections under Title VII, however, are afforded higher con-
stitutional stature by the Court because race, religion, national ori-
gin and sex are more suspect characteristics than age.161 More im-
portantly, the amendment also demonstrates that Congress was 
concerned with potential for conflict between the ADEA and host 
country labor laws.162 The amendment explicitly states that an 
American employer need not comply with the ADEA where extra-
territorial application would violate the laws of the host country.163 
This amendment indicates that labor legislation drafted to elimi-
nate employment discrimination . must have extraterritorial juris-
diction unless actual conflicts occur where American employers 
have substantial control over their foreign affiliates and subsidiar-
ies.164 Using the ADEA amendment as precedent, Congress should 
amend Title VII to protect American citizens employed overseas 
by American employers from employment discrimination based 
upon race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.16& 
159. See supra note 42 and accompanying text. 
160. See supra notes 48-49 and accompanying text. 
161. See Boureslan, 892 F.2d at 1282; see, e.g., Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 197 (1976) 
(heightened scrutiny for sex-based classifications); Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 406 
(1963) (First Amendment protection from religious discrimination); Korematsu v. United 
States, 214, 215 (1944) (heightened scrutiny for racial classifications). But cf. Massachusetts 
Bd. of Retirement v. Murgia, 427 U.S. 307 (1976) (age discrimination is precluded from any 
suspect classification protections). 
162. See Street, Application of U.S. Fair Employment Laws to Transnational Em-
ployers in the United States and Abroad, 19 INT'L L. & PoL. 357, 365-66 (1987). 
163. 29 U.S.C. § 623(f)(l) (Supp. V 1985). 
164. See Boureslan, 892 F.2d at 1279; see also, ADEA 29 U.S.C. § 623(g)(3)(A)-(D) 
(Supp. V 1985); see also Street, supra note 162, at 365-66 ("this 'degree of control' test 
involves an assessment of the interrelation of operations, common management, centralized 
control of labor relations, and common ownership or financial control"). 
165. For a discussion on the questionability of the amendment, see Zimmerman, Extra-
territorial Application of Federal Labor Law: Congress's Flawed Extension of the ADEA, 
21 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 103 (1988) (asserting that the ADEA's amendm~nt "is a dangerous 
precedent" because it is imperialistic legislation that may impair United States foreign 
relations). 
26
Syracuse Journal of International Law and Commerce, Vol. 16, No. 2 [1990], Art. 5
https://surface.syr.edu/jilc/vol16/iss2/5
1990] Boureslan v. Aramco 319 
VI. CONCLUSION 
In light of the principles of international comity and the pre-
sumption against the extraterritorial application of federal labor 
legislation, the majority faithfully adhered to the canon of statu-
tory construction. The presumption against extraterritoriality must 
be upheld because the negative inference of the alien exemption 
provision in Title VII does not qualify as express congressional in-
tent. In the absence of the requisite congressional intent, the 
court's power is restricted by the canon of statutory construction. 
Furthermore, the majority's unwillingess to resolve potential juris-
dictional conflicts indicates that Congress alone has the authority 
to provide Title VII with extraterritorial jurisdiction. 
Despite the dissent's manipulation of the canon of statutory 
construction and its attempts at judicial legislation, analysis un-
derscores the need for the extraterritorial application of Title VII. 
The dissent justified both the extraterritorial application of Title 
VII and the United State's policy of promoting equal employment 
opportunities, and advanced the international consensus against 
employment discrimination. In the light of congressional prece-
dent, the principle of international comity should not preclude the 
extraterritorial application of federal employment discrimination 
legislation. Congress must amend Title VII to redress the denial of 
civil rights owed United States citizens working abroad for Ameri-
can employers. 
Dina S. Goldstein 
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